Highlights  We analyze the effects of financial regulations and reforms on the cost efficiency of banks of 10 CEE countries for the period [2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009].  Cost efficiency scores are estimated using SFA.  Panel regressions examine the impact of regulation on bank performance using the EBRD and the Fraser indicators.  We find that reforms on labor and business markets exert a positive impact on bank performance  We find the effect of credit regulation banking on efficiency is positive.  We find that better capitalized banks are more cost efficient.
Introduction
In Our aim is to investigate the effects of regulatory reforms on CEE banks' cost efficiency during the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . First, we use Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate cost efficiency relative to a single CEE wide cost frontier controlling for country specific characteristics. These efficiency measures are then employed in panel models to estimate the impact of regulation on bank specific cost efficiency. We use an assortment of information, such as the transition indicator of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Fraser economic freedom index (Gwartney et al. 2008 (Gwartney et al. , 2010 (Gwartney et al. , 2012 , to investigate the impact on cost efficiency of regulations related to credit market, as well as restrictions on labor and business markets, while controlling for other bank-specific, country and institutional-specific characteristics. 1 More precisely, we examine the effects of regulation on bank efficiency in terms of two competing hypotheses: the public interest view hypothesis and the private interest view hypothesis. Our results indicate that more liberal labor markets and business sectors seem to be associated with better bank efficiency. On the other hand we find that banking sector reforms have a negative effect on efficiency. However, our results
show strong evidence that better capitalized banks are more cost efficient and this holds irrespective of whether we control for the effects of the overall regulatory environment.
The recent crisis has exposed some major gaps in the growth model for emerging economies as well as gaps in their overall framework for bank supervision and regulation. This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing new evidence on the experiences of CEE countries during the recent crisis paying particular attention to the effects of economy wide regulatory reforms for the banking industry. Such an assessment is of considerable interest for policy makers given the insolvencies of several major banks in Europe, and accompanied large withdrawal of funding from the CEE region by parent banks, thereby intensifying the contraction of credit and ensuing recessionary pressures in several CEE countries. Furthermore, an interesting question with important policy implications is to what extent economic and financial reforms are conducive to improving bank performance and therefore promoting financial stability which brings into the forefront the issue of cost efficiency not only from the point of view of bank's shareholders but from the point of view of the society. In other words is this process of "financialization" socially optimal? 2, 3 What are the interactions between financialization and crises? An answer to the first question is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, we provide empirical evidence that sheds some light on the second question. broad spectrum of the Fraser Index whereas we focus specifically on the subcomponents of the index that have the strongest influence on bank performance.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on bank efficiency and regulations. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 introduces the stochastic frontier model and presents the results of the fixed effects cost efficiency model. Section 5 describes the dynamic panel model and estimation results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
According to Hughes and Mester (2015) two broad approaches are generally used in the literature to explain bank performance: structural and nonstructural. Nonstructural approaches choose different performance measures (e.g. ROE, ROA, net interest margins, Tobin's q-ratio among others), and explain these measures by an assortment of bank specific or institutional factors. Structural approaches are based on theoretical models of banking behavior such as cost minimization or profit maximization. Structural approaches rely on estimating an "efficient frontier" using linear programming methods such as Data Envelopment Analysis or parametric methods such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis and Distribution Free Approach, and treating deviations from such frontier as a measure of inefficiency. Cost efficiency refers to the minimum cost of producing a unit of output given input prices and deviations from minimum cost can be 'technical' arising from excessive input use to produce that output or 'allocative'
arising from employing the wrong input mix given their prices.
Credit market regulation and efficiency
Empirical cross-country studies have analyzed the impact of regulations on bank performance Since higher levels of the credit regulation index are indicating less regulatory restrictions we will expect the index to be negatively related to cost efficiency under H1.
In contrast, from the private interest view the imposition of regulation may increase the risktaking behavior of banks (e.g. Kim 
Labor market and business regulations and efficiency
The institutional settings of the labor market and business sector along with the economy's overall regulatory environment are likely to have an effect on bank efficiency and the stability of the banking system. Several studies (e.g. Blanchard 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this paper was extracted from the IBCA- Broeck, 1977) . Setting the underlying framework of our methodology, every bank in our sample attempts to minimize costs so as to reach the optimum level of minimum cost.
Measuring Cost Efficiency
The following parametric translog specification of the cost function is chosen due to its flexibility: 
Where Ci denotes observed total cost for bank i, Pi is a vector of input prices, Yi is a vector of outputs, Ni is a vector of quasi-fixed inputs, Zi is a vector of control variables, and for simplicity we have dropped the time subscript. Total cost is the sum of overheads (personnel and administrative expenses), interest, fees and commission expenses. The two outputs are: loans (Y1) and other earning assets (Y2) which include government securities, bonds, equity investments, CDs. The vector Pi of input prices contains the price of labor measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (P1) and the price of borrowed fund measured as total interest expenses over total deposits and short-term funding (P2). The special characteristic of equation (1) refers to the error term that consists of two parts, vit accounts essentially for the classical error term that follows a normal distribution whilst uit represents the (one-sided) inefficiency term as bank i could incur higher costs when benchmarked against its best performing peers in the sample. Given that inefficiency cannot take negative values this term follows the half-normal distribution. We also include two fixed inputs, namely physical capital (N1) and equity (N2). Equity inclusion is of some importance as it represents valuable funding and as such could impact upon cost structure (Berger and Mester, 1997) . Moreover, exclusion of equity would result in biased estimations as banks with higher equity capital could display risk aversion in terms of behaviour compared to banks with lower level of equity. 7 The control variables include GDP growth per capita (Z1) to capture cross-country heterogeneity in terms of the underlying macroeconomic framework and the inflation rate (Z2) as a general financial stability index.
Lastly, we apply linear homogeneity and symmetry in quadratic terms in line with duality theory. Country and time effects are also captured. 8 We opt for maximum likelihood estimation of the stochastic frontier model where the parameters of error variance are Table 3 reports cost efficiency estimates obtained from equation (1) 
Cost Efficiency Estimates

Determinants of Cost Efficiency
Next we employ cost efficiency scores, as derived from the sample of CEE countries that share a common frontier, to estimate the impact of the economic environment on bank performance, using as control variables bank specific characteristics and the structure of the national financial systems. Specifically, we adopt panel data methods to estimate a fixed effects model specified as:
Where Effit denotes bank cost efficiency, ZBit is a vector of bank specific characteristics, Xit accounts for the level of economic development and financial structure, whilst regit is a vector of regulation and reform indicators. Fixed effects ( i  ) capture unobserved time-invariant bank specific heterogeneity which may be correlated with the regulation indexes or with observed bank specific variables. Time dummies and country dummies may also be introduced to capture structural changes or other time-varying unobserved effects which may be common across banks and account for differences across countries, respectively. 9 We control for bank characteristics using (log) total assets as a proxy for economies of scale, this can lead to either higher or lower costs for the bank (Fries and Taci, 2005) ; the ratio of loans to assets as a proxy for asset utilisation which is expected to have a positive effect on cost efficiency; the ratio of equity over total assets as a proxy for capital adequacy, which is also expected to have a positive effect on efficiency as better capitalised banks have stronger incentives in improving their performance and minimising costs. We also include loan loss provisions, accounting for the quality of credit portfolio, as a determinant of cost efficiency. In empirical studies there is mixed evidence on the sign of loan loss provisions as their impact on bank performance in the short term may be different compared to the long term. To control for financial structure, we consider the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP (DCPS) capturing the level of development of the financial sector. We also employ the sector credit (CR-Prs), and interest rate controls (CR-Nir) (see Table A1 in Appendix for more detailed description). 12 Based on the private interest view and according to our H1a hypothesis more stringent regulations relative to foreign competition (CR-Comp) and private sector credit (CR-Prs) as well as greater government ownership are expected to be associated with lower bank efficiency, whereas progress with banking reforms and interest rate liberalization (Bankebrd) and the lifting of interest rate controls (CR-Nir) are expected to be positively related to bank efficiency. Table 4 shows results from the baseline model that excludes regulation and reform variables.
Cost Efficiency: Fixed effects results
We find that better capitalised banks are more cost efficient. This result is in line with other studies that find a positive relationship between capital adequacy and efficiency (Berger and INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The Impact of Fraser Index and EBRD Regulations on Cost Efficiency
We consider first the impact of credit regulation (CR), labor market regulation (LR) and business regulation (BR) components of the Fraser index on cost efficiency. Table 5 shows that the three regulation variables are significant at the 1% level. Credit regulation is negatively associated with cost efficiency rendering support to the public interest view hypothesis (H1).
We also find support for the H2 and H3 hypotheses, that less stringent labor market regulation and business sector regulation, respectively, have a positive impact on cost efficiency.
Mamatzakis et al. (2013) find that credit regulation and business regulation are not statistically significant while labour market regulation has a positive effect on efficiency. Table 5 also shows that the effects of capitalisation and size reported in Table 4 are robust to the inclusion of regulation variables. We find that financial deepening (DCPS) has a negative effect on cost efficiency. This finding may reflect the risks associated with excessive credit growth observed in several CEE banking systems in the lead up to the global financial crisis. Finally, inflation is significant at the 1% and positively related to cost efficiency. High inflation affects bank behaviour and induces banks to compete through excessive branch networks (Kasman and Yildirim, 2006).
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
We proceed next to examine the effect of credit regulation on cost efficiency in more detail by considering the main sub-components of the Fraser credit regulation index such as CR-Comp, CR-Nir, and CR-PrS . 13 The results of table 6 show that only the CR-PrS variable is significant on cost efficiency. The negative effect is in line with our previous findings (Table 5) . A possible explanation of the negative relationship between the CR-Prs variable and cost efficiency is that lending to the private sector may entail costly monitoring and screening coupled with the risks of excessive credit growth on financial stability. Most of the control variables remain consistent with the results from the earlier models.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
We turn next to examine the effect of EBRD financial regulation indexes on cost efficiency.
These results are presented in Table 7 . We find that banking reform (Bankebrd) has a negative and significant effect on cost efficiency in the last column that also considers the other two 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Dynamic Panel Analysis
One of the frequent criticisms of models such as equation (2) refers to the endogeneity of some of the right hand variables, in particular bank specific characteristics, especially in situations where unobserved heterogeneity may be changing over time. As a way of addressing this criticism and assess the robustness of our findings we proceed to estimate both a dynamic version of the fixed effects panel model and a panel vector autoregressive model.
Dynamic Fixed Effects Model
A common criticism of the fixed effects panel model is the static nature of the underlying relationships among the variables, when one would expect that such types of relationships evolve over time. This is in addition to endogeneity issues that arise in this context. We employ the Arelano and Bover (1995) dynamic panel data model that uses an instrumental variables methodology based on the GMM estimator to resolve the issue of endogeneity in a dynamic context. The model takes the following general form:
Where Effit denotes cost efficiency of bank i in year t, Zit accounts for bank or country specific control variables and REGit denotes various EBRD or Fraser reform indexes. 14 As before, we find that better capitalized banks are more efficient while size retains a negative association with cost efficiency and the same applies for financial deepening. Similarly, less stringent labor and business regulations have a positive effect on efficiency providing further support for hypotheses H2 and H3. However, we find that credit regulation has no longer an effect on cost efficiency, suggesting that the forces that underpin the two competing hypotheses, H1 and H1a, may be offsetting each other. The EBRD index of market reform capturing competition policy (Compebrd) is significant at the 10% level whereas bank reforms (Bankebrd) and securities markets reforms (Secebrd) are not significant. 
Where Wit is a stacked vector of variables comprising bank efficiency (Eff) and either the Fraser reform indexes covering credit regulation (CR), labor regulation (LR) and business regulation (BR); or alternatively, the three broad aspects of transition EBRD indexes comprising competition policy (Compebrd), financial institutions, banking reform and interest rate liberalization (Bankebrd), and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions (Secebrd). Note that PVARs have the same structure as VAR models where all variables are assumed to be endogenous and interdependent, but add a cross sectional dimension to the specification of the model. This is important since the dynamic structure of (4) above implies that such specifications capture the dynamic interdependencies among the individual units (i).
The coefficient matrix β in (4) has dimension 4x4 matrix, whilst αi captures fixed effects, X controls for other bank or country specific effects, and ei,t denote i. In that case the ordering should be to rank first exogenous variables followed by more endogenous ones in a sequential order (see Love and Zicchino, 2006) . This is the standard identification strategy implicit in the Choleski decomposition, which induces a recursive orthogonal structure on the structure of the shocks. To this end, as regulation is outside the control of the banks, we consider it as the most exogenous variable. Thus, performance measured by the efficiency that comes from cost minimization at bank level, is more endogenous than regulation. The reverse causation has been also tested, providing similar results. 18 INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE In Table 9 (Panel A) we report the variance decomposition (VDC). The findings are consistent with our previous results from the impulse response functions providing additional evidence of the importance of the relationship between reforms and variation in bank efficiency. We find 7.2% of the variation of cost efficiency is explained by labor market regulation, whilst only 0.4% is explained by business regulation. Efficiency also explains part of forecast error variance of regulation, in particular credit regulation and business regulation. Furthermore, our results (Panel B) show that EBRD reforms play a role in the variance decomposition of bank efficiency with 15% and 10% of bank efficiency explained by shocks in banking reform and competition reform, respectively. Thus, a feedback channel from bank performance to regulation, which is highly associated to the environment that banks operate, also exists.
Overall, the VDC analysis confirms the importance of bank specific regulation to bank cost efficiency as credit regulation plays the dominant role, whilst evidence of reverse causation is also present.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE Figure 2 presents the IRFs from the 4x4 panel VAR of cost efficiency and the three EBRD reform indexes. Interestingly, one standard deviation shocks in EBRD reform indexes assert a negative impact on bank efficiency. This result is in line with the EBRD (2010) report that reforms have a negative impact on performance in the short run, and it is only in the long run that the economy could reap the fruits of structural changes towards more competitive forms of markets. 19 Note, however, that in terms of magnitude, the EBRD reform indexes do not have a strong negative impact on bank performance.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence on the importance of reforms and regulations for the banking industry using the EBRD transitional reform indicator and the Fraser economic freedom index. Note: Figures are sample means. lnP 1 (log) labour price, lnP 2 (log) financial capital price, lnY 1 (log) net loans in millions $, lnY 2 (log) other earning assets in millions $, TA: Total assets in millions $, E/A: equity to assets ratio, LLP/L: loan loss provisions over total assets, L/A: loans to assets ratio, DCPS: domestic credit provided to the private sector as % of GDP, SPR: net interest spread, HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, GDPcppp: GDP per capita in purchasing power parity ( Note: Fixed-effects panel estimation of bank efficiency with robust standard errors. TA: total assets; E/A: equity to assets ratio; LLP/L: loan loss provisions to loans ratio; L/A: loans to assets ratio; DCPS: domestic credit provided to the private sector as % of GDP, SPR: net interest spread; INF: inflation rate; CR: credit regulation; LR: labor market regulation; BR: business regulations. Country and time dummies included. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. (EBRD 2010) : markets (competition policy) (Compebrd); banking reform and interest rate liberalization (Bankebrd); and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions (Secebrd)); TA: Total assets; E/A: equity to assets ratio; LLP/L: loan loss provisions to total assets ratio; L/A: loans to assets ratio; DCPS: domestic credit provided to the private sector as % of GDP, SPR: net interest spread. Country and time dummies included. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
CR-Own
Credit Regulations Component Data on the percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks were used to construct rating intervals. Countries with larger shares of privately held deposits received higher ratings. When privately held deposits totalled between 95% and 100%, countries were given a rating of 10. When private deposits constituted between 75% and 95% of the total, a rating of 8 was assigned. When private deposits were between 40% and 75% of the total, the rating was 5. When private deposits totalled between 10% and 40%, countries received a rating of 2. A zero rating was assigned when private deposits were 10% or less of the total.
CR-Comp
Credit Regulations Component If a country approved all or most foreign bank applications and if foreign banks had a large share of the banking sector assets, then the country received a higher rating
CR-PrS
Credit Regulations Component This sub-component measures the extent to which government borrowing crowds out private borrowing. When data are available, this subcomponent is calculated as the government fiscal deficit as a share of gross saving. Since the deficit is expressed as a negative value, higher numerical values result in higher ratings. The formula used to derive the country ratings for this sub-component was (−Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax + Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi is the deficit to gross investment ratio, and the values for Vmax and Vmin are set at 0 and −100.0%, respectively. The formula allocates higher ratings as the deficit gets smaller (i.e., closer to zero) relative to gross saving. If the deficit data are not available, the component is instead based on the share of private credit to total credit extended in the banking sector. Higher values are indicative of greater economic freedom. Thus, the formula used to derive the country ratings for this sub-component was (Vi − Vmin) / (Vmax − Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi is the share of the country's total domestic credit allocated to the private sector and the values for Vmax and Vmin are set at 99.9% and 10.0%, respectively. The 1990 data were used to derive the maximum and minimum values for this component. The formula allocates higher ratings as the share of credit extended to the private sector increases.
CR-NiR
Credit Regulations Component Data on credit-market controls and regulations were used to construct rating intervals. Countries with interest rates determined by the market, stable monetary policy, and positive real deposit and lending rates received higher ratings. When interest rates were determined primarily by market forces and the real rates were positive, countries were given a rating of 10. When interest rates were primarily market determined but the real rates were sometimes slightly negative (less than 5%) or the differential between the deposit and lending rates was large (8% or more), countries received a rating of 8. When the real deposit or lending rate was persistently negative by a single-digit amount or the differential between them was regulated by the government, countries were rated at 6. When the deposit and lending rates were fixed by the government and the real rates were often negative by single-digit amounts, countries were assigned a rating of 4. When the real deposit or lending rate was persistently negative by a double-digit amount, countries received a rating of 2. A zero rating was assigned when the deposit and lending rates were fixed by the government and real rates were persistently negative by double-digit amounts or hyperinflation had virtually eliminated the credit market. 
CR
LR
Labour Regulations
Composite A measure of the extent to which labour market rigidities are present. In order to earn high marks in the LR component, a country must allow market forces to determine wages and establish the conditions of hiring and firing, and refrain from the use of conscription.
BR
Business Regulations Composite
The variable aims to identify the extent to which regulations and bureaucratic procedures restrain entry and reduce competition. In order to score high in this part of the index, countries must allow markets to determine prices and refrain from regulatory activities that retard entry into business and increase the cost of producing products. They also must refrain from using their power to extract financial payments and reward some businesses at the expense of others. 
